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Abstract: The withdrawal of foreign capital from emerging countries at the height
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis and its quick return sparked a debate about the impact
of capital ﬂow surges on asset markets. This paper addresses the response of property
prices to an inﬂow of foreign capital. For that purpose we estimate a panel VAR on a set
of Asian emerging market economies, for which the waves of inﬂows were particularly
pronounced, and identify capital inﬂow shocks based on sign restrictions. Our results
suggest that capital inﬂow shocks have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the appreciation of house
prices and equity prices. Capital inﬂow shocks account for - roughly - twice the portion
of overall house price changes they explain in OECD countries. We also address cross-
country diﬀerences in the house price responses to shocks, which are most likely due
to diﬀerences in the monetary policy response to capital inﬂows.
Keywords: Capital Inﬂows, House Prices, Monetary Policy, Sign Restrictions, Panel
VAR
JEL classiﬁcation: F32, F41, E32
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Over the recent years emerging market economies experienced large swings in net
capital inﬂows. While net capital inﬂows peaked in early 2008 at about 4% of emerging
markets’ GDP, they dropped to -2.5% following the collapse of Lehman Brothers at
the height of the ﬁnancial crisis. Interestingly, however, capital ﬂows quickly resumed
in early 2009. In Asia, ﬂows already exceeded the pre-crisis level in early 2010.2
Capital inﬂows are, in principle, highly welcome in emerging economies. They lower the
costs of funding, help raise the standard of living and thus facilitate convergence with
advanced economies. Likewise, cross-border ﬂows, by oﬀering investment opportunities
and extending the set of available assets, contribute to economic eﬃciency and risk
sharing also in the source countries. Nevertheless, capital inﬂows often have many
unwarranted eﬀects: First, they can lead to a real exchange rate appreciation that
undermines competitiveness in the tradeable goods sector. Second, by preventing the
central bank from tightening monetary policy, they can lead the economy to overheat,
generating inﬂationary pressures. Third, they can trigger and prolong asset price
bubbles and amplify ﬁnancial fragility.
The latter impact is the focus of this paper. In light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis that
originated in a housing price bubble in the U.S., researchers and policymakers focus
again on the housing market as a key indicator for ﬁnancial imbalances and macro-
economic risks. Federal Reserve chairman Bernanke (2010) explicitly linked capital
inﬂows to accelerating house price inﬂation and bubbly property prices. Although he
focused on the U.S. case, the capital ﬂow-house price nexus is arguably even more
important for emerging countries.
This paper studies the response of property prices in emerging market economies to
an inﬂow of foreign capital. Our contribution is threefold:
First, we estimate a panel vector autoregression (VAR) on a set of Asian emerging
market economies for which the waves of inﬂows were particularly pronounced. A
panel approach is best suited to summarize the data in light of the short sample
period available after the disruptions of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. The paper focuses
on Asia because capital quickly returned to this region after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis,
inﬂows are more homogenous across countries in this region than compared to, say,
Latin America and, ﬁnally, house prices experienced considerable upward pressure over
the past years.
Second, we use sign restrictions following the work of Uhlig (2005) and, in particular,
Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011) to identify capital inﬂow shocks and the responses
of house prices and equity prices to these shocks. Our approach avoids an arbitrary
ordering of the variables that often characterizes triangular identiﬁcation schemes used
2The numbers are taken from IMF (2011a). See Tille (2011) a survey on capital ﬂo w st oA s i a
during the crisis and IMF (2011b) and Balakrishnan et al. (2012) for discussions of policy responses.
2in other VAR studies on asset price dynamics and monetary policy reviewed below.
The shock we identify can best be interpreted as an unexpected increase in foreigner’s
demand for domestic assets. The driving forces behind international capital ﬂows
are often classiﬁed in terms of push and pull factors. Push factors, deﬁned as ﬁnan-
cial and macroeconomic conditions in advanced economies, lead investors in advanced
economies to send funds to emerging markets. In contrast, pull factors are given by
conditions in the recipient countries attracting foreign investors. The capital inﬂow
shock identiﬁed here is consistent with a shock to push factors.3
Third, we use the estimated panel VAR to shed light on cross-country diﬀerences in the
responses of both types of asset prices, i.e. house prices and equity prices, to capital
inﬂow shocks. For that purpose we exclude each country in turn from our panel VAR
and estimate the VAR on the remaining set of countries. This gives us a set of impulse
response functions from which the relative eﬀect stemming from one country in the
panel can be gauged.
Our results suggest that capital inﬂow shocks had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on real house
price appreciation. A shock that increases net capital inﬂows relative to GDP by one
percentage point leads to an increase in real house prices of 0.5%. Although capital
inﬂow shocks account for only a moderate small portion of overall house price changes,
about 10% to 15% depending on the speciﬁcation, this fraction is about twice as large as
what has been found for OECD countries.4 T h es h o c k sw ei d e n t i f yc a p t u r et h ec a p i t a l
ﬂight in 2008 and the massive return of capital coinciding with the unconventional
monetary policies in industrial countries since 2009. To corroborate these ﬁndings, we
also estimate the responses of equity prices to capital inﬂow shocks and restrict capital
ﬂows to portfolio inﬂows only. Finally, we ﬁnd important cross-country diﬀerences in
the sensitivity to capital ﬂow shocks, which cannot be explained by mortgage market
characteristics or property market regulation. Instead, our results are consistent with
the view that aggregate macro policies such as the monetary policy response to inﬂows
are the main determinant of cross-country heterogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section brieﬂy
summarizes the related literature. Section three introduces the panel VAR model,
provides details on the data set, the construction of the main variables and explains
the identifying restrictions. The main ﬁndings are discussed in section four. Section
ﬁve presents results from alternative speciﬁcations to corroborate the robustness of
the previous ﬁndings. Section six sheds light on the cross-country heterogeneity in the
asset price responses to capital inﬂow shocks. Section seven summarizes the results
and draws some conclusions.
3Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2011) stress the role of push-factors for
recent periods of massive capital inﬂows. See also Förster, Jorra and Tillmann (2012) for an analysis
of the global comovement of capital ﬂows.
4See Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011) for these ﬁndings for OECD countries.
32 Related literature
The present paper contributes to understanding the linkages between capital inﬂows
and asset price surges with a particular focus on house price dynamics. Three strands
of the literature are particularly relevant for this task. We brieﬂyp o r t r a ys o m ek e y
contributions to each strand with an eye on VAR studies and pay particular attention
to papers addressing Asian economies.
First, a number of papers estimate reduced form relationships between asset prices
and the current account.5 Based on a large cross-section of countries Kole and Martin
(2009) ﬁnd a robust negative correlation between the growth rate of house prices and
the change in a country’s current account balance. Likewise, Aizenman and Jinjarak
(2009) ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between current account deﬁcits and real
estate prices. The causality between house prices and the current account is studied
by Jinjarak and Sheﬀrin (2011). They argue that current account deﬁcits were unlikely
to directly drove real estate prices in the US, Spain and Ireland. As shown by Kannan,
Rabanal and Scott (2011), after 1985 a deteriorating current account balance is shown
to be a strong leading indicator for house price busts in OECD countries.
Second, some studies use VARs to estimate the dynamic interaction between asset
price, capital ﬂows and the macroeconomy and explicitly identify capital inﬂow shocks.
Kim and Yang (2009) use a VAR model to analyze the eﬀects of capital inﬂow shocks
on asset prices in Korea. They ﬁnd that capital inﬂow shocks have an eﬀect on equity
prices but not on property prices. These shocks are, however, identiﬁed by imposing
a recursive ordering onto the variables. In light of the mutual interactions between
asset prices, capital ﬂows and the macroeconomic environment imposing this ordering
requires a substantial amount on arbitrariness. Think of the relationship between
asset price and monetary policy shocks. A triangular identiﬁcation scheme forces
the researcher to impose ex ante the direction of causality between asset prices and
monetary policy within a quarter. In a related paper, Kim and Yang (2011) extend
their work to a panel VAR estimated on ﬁve Asian economies between 1999-2006.
Again, capital inﬂow shocks explain only a small fraction of asset price ﬂuctuations.
This paper suﬀers from the same weakness as the authors rely on an ad-hoc ordering
of the variables to interpret the estimated shocks.
The relationship among asset markets and the current account is also studied by
Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2010), although with a slightly diﬀerent focus. The
authors use a VAR with a sign-restriction identiﬁcation scheme to assess the impact of
5In a recent theoretical contribution, Adam, Kuang and Marcet (2012) develop an open economy
asset pricing model for the G7 economies in which households entertain subjective beliefs about price
behavior that are potentially decoupled from fundamentals. A two-country two-sector model which
illustrates the link between a property price boom and the current account is presented by Punzi
(2012). Favilukis et al. (2011) argue that capital ﬂows play only a limited role in boom-bust cycles in
property prices. Instead, they point to the reversal of ﬁnancial market liberalization as a key driver.
4asset market shocks on the U.S. current account. While a few studies try to identify
capital ﬂows shocks, Helbling et al. (2011) instead use sign restrictions to identify a
credit shock. According to their estimates, credit shocks, in particular those origi-
nating in the U.S. during the recent global ﬁnancial crisis, are an important driver of
ﬂuctuations in the G7 economies.
The study by Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011) is closest the our paper and estimates
a panel VAR for OECD countries. Capital inﬂow shocks derived from sign restrictions
are shown to be important driving forces of house prices and other housing market
variables. Moreover, the large panel dimension allows the authors to reveal cross-
country diﬀerences and the relation to mortgage market characteristics. A better
developed mortgage market leads to even stronger eﬀects of capital inﬂow shocks. In
the empirical analysis below we apply a similar identiﬁcation scheme to a panel of
Asian emerging market economies.
Third, recent studies focus on the response of property markets to monetary policy
shocks. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008)
estimate panel VARs on 17 OECD countries to show that monetary policy shocks
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on asset prices. A VAR for several Asian emerging economies
is estimated by Bracke and Fidora (2008). The authors use sign restrictions to identify
monetary policy shocks which are shown to explain a large part of asset price ﬂuc-
tuations. To improve the eﬃcacy of the estimation, the authors aggregate individual
economies using GDP weights.
Vargas-Silva (2008) uses sign restrictions to quantify the response of U.S. house prices
to monetary policy shocks. He ﬁnds that housing starts and residential investment
responds to a policy tightening, although the impact is aﬀected by a large degree
of uncertainty. Similarly, Mallick and Sousa (2011) provide evidence on the eﬀects
monetary policy shocks, again identiﬁed via sign restrictions, on real equity prices in
large open economies such as Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. Our method
is also similar to the recent work of Carstensen, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2009)
and Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2011), who estimate a panel VAR with
shocks identiﬁed via sign restrictions. They are, however, interested in identifying loan
supply shocks and monetary policy shocks, not capital inﬂow shocks.
3T h e e m p i r i c a l m o d e l
3.1 A panel VAR approach
A panel structure allows us increase the degrees of freedom in the estimation process
in light of the short sample period after the Asian crisis of 1997. This will lead to more
eﬃcient estimates than a country-by-country analysis. The estimated panel VAR of
5order  takes the following form
 = 0 + 1−1 + 2−2 +  + − +  (1)
with time index  =1 − and country index  =1 where  is an ×1 vector
of data for country ,  are × coeﬃcient matrices and  is the vector of one-step
ahead prediction errors with variance-covariance matrix Σ.T h ev e c t o r0 consists of
country-speciﬁc intercepts. We collect the coeﬃcient matrices in  =( 0
10
).T h e
matrix polynomial in the lag operator  is ().
In order to translate the reduced-form innovations  into meaningful structural shocks
, we need a matrix  such that
 =  (2)
with Σ =  [0
]= [0
]0 = 0.T h e r ea r e( − 1)2 degrees of freedom
in specifying . The identifying restrictions needed to obtain that, besides those
emerging from the covariance structure, are imposed following Uhlig’s (2005) seminal
(pure) sign-restrictions approach. One popular alternative would to let  beaCholesky
factor of Σ , which implies a recursive - but often arbitrary - ordering of the variables.
The identiﬁcation is achieved by imposing restrictions on the sign of the impulse re-
sponses of the endogenous variables.6 Uhlig (2005) shows that any impulse vector
 can be recovered if an -dimensional vector  of unit length is chosen such that
 = ˜ ,w h e r e ˜  ˜ 0 = Σ,a n d ˜  is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σ.7
A Normal-Wishart prior in (()Σ) is formed for the reduced-form VAR. The poste-
rior is the Normal-Wishart for (()Σ) times the indicator function that discriminates
the draws on the basis of the imposed sign restrictions. For each  draw, we compute
the associated  vector and calculate the impulse responses as described before. If the
resulting impulse response has the correct sign, i.e. the prespeciﬁed sign, the draw is
kept. If not, the draw is discarded. We take 1 draws from the VAR posterior and
2 draws from an independent uniform prior. The impulse responses are calculated
at horizon  =0  (in quarters). We stop after obtaining 3 impulse response
functions with the desired sign. The error bands are calculated using the draws kept.
We set 1 = 2 = 2000 and 3 = 1000.
The model is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This warrants some dis-
cussion as the OLS estimator with ﬁxed-eﬀects is known to be potentially biased in a
dynamic panel setting if the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables diﬀer across coun-
tries. As discussed in Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008), restricting the coeﬃ-
cients to be the same across groups induces serial correlation in the residuals when the
6The following exposition follows Uhlig (2005) and Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2010).
7An alternative identiﬁction based on a combination of short and long run restrictions is proposed
by Bjornland and Jacobsen (2010).
6regressors are autocorrelated. A popular way to solve this problem is to apply Pesaran
and Smith’s (1995) mean-group estimator, which is used in Assenmacher-Wesche and
Gerlach (2008) and Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011). To be a viable solution, however,
the mean-group estimator requires the time dimension of the panel to be suﬃciently
large to estimate country-speciﬁcV A R sw h o s ec o e ﬃcients can be averaged across coun-
tries. This requirement is clearly violated in our setup as the sample period covers one
decade only. In fact, Rebucci (2003) ﬁnds that the mean-group estimator typically
requires a time dimension that exceeds the length of a typical macroeconomic dataset.
To address the issue of cross—country diﬀerences, besides the illustrative approach
presented below, we also estimated the model using a random-coeﬃcient approach in
which the coeﬃcients in the  matrices are allowed to vary randomly around a com-
mon mean. This yields results that are virtually identical to those obtained with the
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. In light of these diﬃculties, we therefore continue to use the
ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator.
3.2 The data set
We estimate the model for Asian emerging economies using two alternative VAR spec-
iﬁcations, each of which is estimated for two alternative capital inﬂow series and two
alternative asset prices. Our estimation period and the set of countries is dictated by
data availability. For many Asian economies,r e l i a b l eh o u s ep r i c ei n d i c e sa r ea v a i l a b l e
only after the Asian crisis. This leaves us with ﬁve economies, for which data is avail-
able from 2000:1, i.e. Korea (KOR), Hong Kong (HKG), Malaysia (MAL), Thailand
(THA) and Taiwan (TWN). The estimation period for this sample ends in 2011:1.
Based on standard lag selection criteria the lag order for this panel VAR, henceforth
referred to as VAR I, is set to  =4 . For Singapore house prices are available from
2003. Therefore, we set up a second VAR, henceforth VAR II, which also covers Sin-
gapore (SGP). The lag order of this VAR model, for which the estimation sample ends
in 2010:4, is set to  =3 . Table (1) summarizes the alternative VAR speciﬁcations.
Table 1: VAR speciﬁcations
VAR I VAR II
sample 2000:1 - 2011:1 2003:1 - 2010:4
lag order 4 3
c o u n t r i e s H K G ,K O R ,M A L , H K G ,K O R ,M A L ,
THA, TWN SGP, THA, TWN
variables , , , ,
, , 
Each VAR contains the following quarterly data series: net capital inﬂows in percent of
GDP (), log real GDP (), the log consumer price index (), the log
7real eﬀective exchange rate (), a log real asset price (), the long-term
() and the short-term interest rate (). All variables enter the VAR
in levels. Thus, the vector  consists of
 =[       ]
0 (3)
To assess the role of diﬀerent types of capital inﬂows, the  variable repre-
sents either total net capital inﬂows deﬁned as the sum of foreign direct investment,
portfolio and other types of capital inﬂows or portfolio capital inﬂows only. We are also
interested in contrasting the response of house prices to capital inﬂow shocks with that
of other equity prices. For that purpose, the  variable represents either real
house prices or real equity prices. A higher value of  means a real appreciation
of the domestic exchange rate.
The macroeconomic data series are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Sta-
tistics Database, while the real eﬀective exchange rate series are obtained from the
BIS’s website. Data on house prices is taken from the CEIC database.
3.3 The identifying restrictions
In this paper a capital inﬂow shock is interpreted as an unexpected inﬂow of foreign
capital unrelated to domestic fundamentals, thus resulting from global push-factors.
This requires us to carefully distinguish a capital inﬂow shock from other sources of
capital inﬂows, e.g. a shock to domestic productivity or demand, which would also
attract foreign inﬂows of capital.
The set of restrictions imposed in this paper is summarized in table (2).
Table 2: Sign restrictions
VAR with VAR with
restriction on total capital inﬂows portfolio inﬂows
sign horizon sign horizon
capital inﬂows +  =2 +  =1
GDP +  =2 +  =1
price level unrestricted unrestricted
REER appreciation +  =2 +  =1
asset prices unrestricted unrestricted
long rate -  =2 -  =1
short rate unrestricted unrestricted
These restrictions correspond to those imposed by Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011)
extended by a constraint on the output response. An expansionary capital inﬂow
8shock is supposed to increase capital inﬂows, leads to an increase in economic activity,
puts appreciation pressure on the real eﬀective exchange rate and lowers long term
interest rates. The restrictions are imposed for a horizon of  =2quarters for the
VAR model containing total capital inﬂows and  =1quarter for the portfolio-VAR.
Given the volatility of net portfolio inﬂows, a restriction over two quarters might be
too restrictive.
These eﬀects are consistent with a broad range of empirical studies on capital inﬂows
to emerging economies. Let us brieﬂy sketch selected recent contributions. A complete
survey is beyond the scope of this paper: Cardarelli, Elekdag and Kose (2010) analyse
the implications of surges in private capital inﬂows in a large group of emerging and
advanced economies. They conclude that capital inﬂow periods are associated with
an acceleration of GDP growth and a real appreciation.8 Likewise, Jongwanich (2010)
estimates a dynamic panel model to understand the nexus between capital ﬂows and
real exchange rates for the period 2000-2009, which roughly corresponds to our sample.
He shows that both portfolio and FDI inﬂows lead to a signiﬁcant real appreciation.
Capital inﬂows also increase liquidity and depresse long-term interest rates. In the
present setting, this constitutes an unwarranted monetary easing as many economies
operate close to or even above potential and face strong inﬂationary pressure. The
recent study by Pradhan et al. (2011) ﬁnds that an increase in nonresident participa-
tion in local bond markets by one percentage point reduces nominal long-term bond
yields by about ﬁve basis points on average. As discussed in Sá, Towbin and Wieladek
(2011), restricting the long-term interest rate is crucial in order to distinguish a capital
inﬂow shock, i.e. an unexpected increase in foreign demand for domestic assets, from
other shocks. A positive productivity shock or a demand shock, for example, would
also result in capital inﬂows and a real appreciation, but would increase rather then
decrease the (real) long-term interest rate. Since Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011) ﬁnd
that including the nominal or the real interest rate makes no diﬀerence for the results,
we opt for the nominal interest rate for reasons of data availability.
Note that the response of the asset price, which is the central focus of this paper, is left
unrestricted. The same is true for the monetary policy response, i.e. the short-term
interest rate, and the price level.
4R e s u l t s
The resulting impulse response functions for both models i.e. the VAR I and VAR II,
two alternative asset price series, i.e. house prices and equity prices, and two alternative
capital inﬂow series are shown in ﬁgures (1) to (8). All ﬁgures show the response of
the seven endogenous variables to a capital inﬂow shock one standard deviation in
8Kim and Kim (2011) study the role of capital inﬂows for the degree of business cycle synchroniza-
tion in Asia and ﬁnd an expansionary eﬀect of capital inﬂow shocks on GDP.
9size. In all ﬁgures the solid line represents the median response across all draws. The
surrounding conﬁdence bands are constructed using the 15th and 84th percentile of
the accepted responses.
T h ec o r er e s u l ti st h a tap o s i t i v ec a p i t a li n ﬂow shock leads to a signiﬁcant and per-
sistent appreciation of both house prices and equity prices. A shock of one standard
deviation leads to capital inﬂo w so fo n ep e r c e n to fG D Pa n da ni n c r e a s ei nr e a lh o u s e
prices of about 0.5 percent, see ﬁgure (1). The resulting increase in equity prices is
almost four times as large, see ﬁgure (2). The impulse responses also reveal that con-
sumer prices increase for a prolonged time period after an unexpected surge in capital
inﬂows. Monetary policy tightens with some time lag of about three to four quarters.
The VARs estimated with portfolio inﬂows instead of total capital inﬂows, see ﬁgures
(3) and (4), yield very similar results.
The six-country VAR speciﬁcation, our VAR II model, generates slightly stronger house
price responses than the ﬁve-country model, see ﬁgure (5), when estimated on total
capital inﬂows. This reﬂects the house price surge in Singapore, which is missing in the
smaller VAR I model. For portfolio inﬂows, the results become insigniﬁcant. Another
striking ﬁnding from the VAR II is the negative response of the short-term interest
rate following a shock to capital inﬂows. This ﬁnding is also discussed in the following
section.
Table (3) reports the fraction of the forecast error variance of asset prices explained
by the capital inﬂow shock. Two ﬁndings stand out. First, the explained portion
is larger when the model is estimated on portfolio ﬂows only rather than on total
inﬂows. Second, when compared to the ﬁndings of Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011),
the fraction of house price variance explained by capital inﬂow shocks is roughly twice
as large as in OECD countries. Although the overall eﬀect appears moderate with a
share of about 10% to 15% of house price dynamics accounted for by capital inﬂow
shocks, two remarks are warranted. First, these numbers refer to real house prices.
Given the persistent inﬂationary eﬀect of capital inﬂows shocks, the eventual response
of nominal house prices will be much larger. Second, the capital ﬂow shocks reﬂect
changes in global push-factors only. In addition to that, capital ﬂows attracted by
domestic conditions such as favorable growth prospects, would also contribute to asset
price developments.
Figures (9) to (12) depict the identiﬁed capital inﬂow shocks for the recent crisis period,
i.e. from the ﬁrst quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2010. The shocks capture the
boom-bust cycle observed in aggregate capital inﬂow data. Large negative shocks
are observed for the second half of 2008, i.e. after the Lehman collapse, followed by
exceptionally strong inﬂows in the ﬁrst half of 2010.
105R o b u s t n e s s
In this section we perform a number of robustness checks to corroborate the ﬁndings
presented before. A ﬁrst modiﬁcation pertains to the treatment of the variables. Al-
though some of the variables exhibit a trending behavior, the baseline speciﬁcation
includes a constant as the only deterministic variable. This is in line with the bulk of
the literature. To nevertheless address that issue, we linearly detrend the GDP, the
price level and the house price series before the estimation stage. For the remaining
variables, i.e. capital inﬂows, interest rates and the real exchange rate, a time trend
appears to be less plausible. The results of this speciﬁcation based on the otherwise
unchanged baseline VAR speciﬁcation are presented in ﬁgure (13). While the size of
the eﬀect of capital inﬂow shocks on house prices remains roughly unchanged, the
eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant.
Second, a large fraction of the available observations stems from the recent ﬁnancial
crisis. To isolate the eﬀect of the crisis, we estimate the model up to 2008:2, i.e. we
close the estimation window before the Lehman collapse in the second half of 2008 and
the resulting ﬁnancial meltdown. We chose the VAR II model for that exercise to see
whether the negative interest rate response following a capital inﬂow shock observed
before is indeed due to aggressive policy measures to combat the crisis. The results
are presented in ﬁgure (14). While the eﬀect of shocks on house prices is smaller in the
pre-crisis sample than in the complete sample presented before, the negative response
of the short-term interest rate remains puzzling. This probably reﬂects the drastic
interest rate cuts in Singapore starting in mid-2006. Singapore is not covered by the
VAR I model which exhibits a positive interest rate response for the complete sample
period.
Finally, all impulse response functions presented in this paper are constructed using
the identiﬁcation scheme shown before. Another set of restrictions, hence, could alter
the dynamic responses. Additional results (which are available upon request) reveal
that lifting the restriction on the real exchange rate appreciation has almost no eﬀect
on the results. Furthermore, dropping the restriction on the long-term interest rate
leaves the results unchanged. The restriction of a positive impact response on GDP
matters for the VAR II but not the VAR I. This probably reﬂects the increased focus
on the ﬁnancial crisis in the former VAR setup that would otherwise be dominated by
the fallout from the global recession in 2008/2009.
To summarize, our results appear reasonably robust with respect to selected modi-
ﬁcations of the empirical speciﬁcation. In light of the short time span available for
estimation, however, the empirical evidence remains tentative.
116 Cross-country heterogeneity
The choice of a panel model is likely to obscure important cross-country diﬀerences
in the dynamic responses to shocks. We mainly resort to panel techniques to cope
with the small sample size. In addition, the cross-sectional dimension is small due to
data availability. Thus, the estimation of country-speciﬁc VAR models is no viable
alternative.9
To address the extent of cross-country heterogeneity in the responses to capital inﬂow
shocks despite the small dimension of the panel at hand, we estimate the VAR II
model repeatedly and exclude each country in turn. This gives us six impulse response
functions, each for a set of ﬁve out of the available six countries. Suppose we exclude
country  from the VAR. Comparing the impulse response functions of the overall
model with that obtaining without country  allows us to roughly assess country ’s
contribution to the overall ﬁndings.
Figure (15) reveals that excluding Hong Kong, Korea or Singapore results in smaller ef-
fects of capital inﬂow shocks compared to the full model. The upper panel of the graph
shows that the responses of the remaining ﬁve-country VAR model are all smaller than
the impulse response of the full, i.e. six-country, VAR. Take the response four quar-
ters after the shock. Excluding one of these three countries, the response is roughly
half as strong as the benchmark impulse response including all countries. Excluding
Malaysia, Thailand or Taiwan, in contrast, leads to stronger responses as shown in the
lower panel of ﬁgure (15). This, in turn, implies that the response are exceptionally
strong in Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore and relatively weak in the remaining set
of countries. Since these ﬁndings reﬂect only the marginal impact on the panel of ex-
cluding one country, the cross-country diﬀerences documented here can be interpreted
as conservative estimates of the true degree of heterogeneity.
Two factors could, in principle, be responsible for the observed diﬀerences in the re-
sponses to capital inﬂow shocks across countries: (1) mortgage market characteristics
as surveyed in Zhu (2006), Glindro et al. (2011) and Sá, Towbin and Wieladek (2011)
and (2) the monetary policy response to capital inﬂows. If diﬀerent mortgage market
characteristics across Asian economies are behind the diﬀerent response patterns, the
pattern should be diﬀerent for equity price responses which are not aﬀected by institu-
tional details of the respective housing markets. If, however, monetary policy explains
cross-country diﬀerences, the responses of equity prices should be similar as equity
a n dh o u s ep r i c er e s p o n s e sa r el i k e l yt ob es i m i l a r l ya ﬀected by the monetary policy
stance. In other words, the diﬀerences between the house price responses and equity
price responses contain information about the underlying sources of heterogeneity.
Figure (16) reports the same exercise based on the VAR II model with equity prices.
9Carstensen, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2009) use a data-driven approach to split a panel into
two disjoint groups. Although appealing, this procedure is not feasible here due to the small number
of countries.
12The results are striking: the response of equity prices to capital inﬂows leads to the
same grouping of countries than before. We clearly see that the exclusion of Hong
Kong, Korea and Singapore leads to a much smaller response in the remaining ﬁve-
country panel. Put diﬀerently, in the three countries the stock market responses are
exceptionally strong. This exactly corresponds to the grouping of countries in the VAR
on house prices discussed before. Hence, this points to monetary policy responses as the
key factor determining the strength of the asset price responses and reﬂects the focus
on maintaining the currency board in Hong Kong and the managed exchange rate in
Singapore which prevents the monetary authorities to tighten policy. Moreover, many
other Asian central banks, among them the Bank of Korea, are reluctant to tighten
policy fearing that a wider return diﬀerential with respect to mature economies would
attract even larger capital inﬂows.10
While the results corroborate the notion that macroeconomic policy explains cross-
country diﬀerences, the ﬁndings not necessarily imply that macroprudential policies
such as loan-to-value (LTV) limits, which were introduced in Hong Kong and Korea,
were ineﬀective.11 Given the bluntness of monetary policy as an instrument to contain
asset price booms (see Crowe et al. (2011) for this point), the evidence presented here
is consistent with the view that macroprudential measures haven not been used boldly
enough to prevent bubbly house price developments.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper estimated the impact of capital inﬂow shocks on property prices and equity
prices in Asian economies using a panel VAR with sign restrictions for a post-2000
sample. The key results are that, ﬁrst, capital inﬂow shocks signiﬁcantly push up
housing prices and stock prices and, second, are twice as important for the development
of asset prices than in OECD countries. A third ﬁnding revealed that cross-country
diﬀerences in the responses to capital inﬂow shocks are not due to housing market
characteristics or the use of macroprudential policies directed to contain property price
bubbles. Instead, the evidence is consistent with the view that diﬀerences in macro
policies, e.g. monetary policy, are the source of heterogeneity across countries.
The ebb and ﬂow of capital inﬂows over the recent years did indeed contribute to
the observed surge in house prices. This also implies that ongoing inﬂows of capital
pushed to emerging economies by loose monetary conditions in advanced economies
p o s e ss e r i o u sr i s k st oﬁnancial stability in the recipient countries.
Here we quantify the impact of shocks to push-factors over which domestic policies
have no control. While our evidence suggests that a monetary tightening could dampen
10See IMF (2011b) for a discussion of the remaining room of regional central banks to raise interest
rates in light of capital inﬂows.
11The empirical case for macroprudential policies in Asia such as LTV ratios and other measures is
discussed in Igan and Kang (2011), Wong et al. (2011) and Craig and Hua (2011).
13the eﬀect on asset markets, raising interest rates in order to dampen property prices
increases is certainty too blunt an instrument to be applied in non-crisis periods. A
deeper empirical analysis of the impact of macroprudential policy measures is needed,
which have recently been employed throughout the region, to assess their eﬀectiveness.
It will also be informative to see how an unwinding of capital inﬂows, probably due
to an eventual tightening of monetary conditions in mature economies, will aﬀect
emerging economies’ asset prices.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a ﬁve-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and house prices
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Figure 2: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a ﬁve-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and equity prices
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Figure 3: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a ﬁve-country
VAR with portfolio inﬂows and house prices
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Figure 4: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a ﬁve-country
VAR with portfolio inﬂows and equity prices
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Figure 5: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and house prices
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Figure 6: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and equity prices
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Figure 7: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
VAR with portfolio inﬂows and house prices
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Figure 8: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
VAR with portfolio inﬂows and equity prices
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Figure 9: Capital inﬂow shocks obtained from a ﬁve-country VAR with total capital
inﬂows and house price
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Figure 10: Capital inﬂow shocks obtained from a ﬁve-country VAR with total capital
inﬂows and equity price
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Figure 11: Capital inﬂow shocks obtained from a ﬁve-country VAR with portfolio
inﬂows and house price
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Figure 12: Capital inﬂow shocks obtained from a ﬁve-country VAR with portfolio
inﬂows and equity price
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Figure 13: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a ﬁve-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and house prices and detrended GDP, price level and
house price series
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Figure 14: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
VAR with total capital inﬂows and house prices excluding the ﬁnancial crisis
25Table 3: Forecast error variance decomposition
model forecast horizon variance share explained by capital inﬂow shock
(in quarters) with total capital inﬂows with portfolio inﬂows
VAR I 1 0.09 0.14
with house prices 4 0.08 0.15
8 0.08 0.15
12 0.10 0.14
VAR I 1 0.15 0.12
with equity prices 4 0.14 0.13
8 0.15 0.13
12 0.15 0.13
VAR II 1 0.11 0.15
with house prices 4 0.10 0.13
8 0.11 0.12
12 0.11 0.11
VAR II 1 0.12 0.14
with equity prices 4 0.11 0.14
8 0.12 0.13
12 0.12 0.13
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Figure 15: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a VAR with
house prices in which a given country is excluded
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Figure 16: Impulse responses after a capital inﬂow shock obtained from a six-country
V A Rw i t he q u i t yp r i c e si nw h i c hag i v e nc o u n t r yi se x c l u d e d
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